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Resumen 
Las guerras han sido un fenómeno global que a través de los años han afectado 
no solo a ciertas civilizaciones, sino al mundo entero. Por esta razón, el siguiente trabajo 
examina la importancia de aprender e investigar sobre temas bélicos a través de la 
visión de dos de los más reconocidos estrategas de la guerra, Sun Tzu y Carl von 
Clausewitz, utilizando los libros que escribieron siglos atrás. En este sentido, describiré 
el contenido de cada libro para analizar la guerra desde ambas perspectivas, oriental y 
occidental. Después, estableceré las similitudes y las diferencias entre ellos, tomando en 
cuenta factores que los influenciaron a hacer escrito sus libros como la época, o la 
realidad social a la que se enfrentaron en aquel entonces. Posteriormente, realizaré un 
análisis profundo para explicar la cercana convergencia que estas obras maestras tienen 
bajo la teoría del realismo, sostenida por los principios e ideas de Kenneth Waltz y Hans 
Morgenthau, para demostrar la relevancia de su trabajo dentro del campo de las 
relaciones internacionales. Finalmente, concluiré por establecer la vital importancia de 
estudiar acerca de temas bélicos a través de las diferentes visiones de los autores 
previamente mencionados, incluso estando en el siglo XXI, para entender de una mejor 
manera al mundo en el que vivimos hoy. 
Palabras Clave: Guerra, estudios de guerra, estrategias de combate, Sun Tzu, Carl von 
Clausewitz, teoría del realismo, teoría del neorrealismo, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth 
Waltz. 
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Abstract 
Wars have been a global phenomenon that throughout the years have affected 
not only several civilizations, but the entire world. For this reason, the present paper 
examines the relevance of learning and investigating about war affairs through the eyes 
of two of the most well-known strategists of war, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, by 
using the books they wrote centuries ago. In this sense, I will describe the content of 
each book to analyze war from both, an Eastern and a Western perspective. Then I will 
establish the similarities and differences between them taking into account factors that 
have influenced them to write their books, like the epoch, or the social reality that they 
were facing at that time. After that, I will make a deeper analysis by explaining the 
narrow convergence that their masterpieces have under the theory of realism, sustained 
by the principles and ideas of Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau, to show the 
relevance of their work in the field of international relations. Finally, I will conclude by 
stating the vital importance of studying war affairs through the different visions of the 
aforementioned authors even at the 21st century to understand in a better manner, the 
world in which we live today.  
Key Words: War, war studies, combat strategies, Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, theory 
of realism, theory of neorealism, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz. 
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Realist analysis of war between “The Art of War” of Sun Tzu and “On 
War” of Carl von Clausewitz: Different cultural perspectives of war 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the main aspects that has influenced in the development or debacle of 
civilizations is war. War has certainly been present throughout the history of the world 
as a method of conflict resolution that has arisen due to the unstoppable impulse to 
attain power. For this reason, there have been important strategists and theorists of war 
that have analyzed from different points of view the causes and consequences of war, 
and the optimum strategies to win battles. This research paper will be focused on 
analyzing and comparing two of the most well-known masterpieces about strategies of 
war written by Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, authors that have contributed to the 
study of warfare since ancient times. They present an Eastern and Western perspective 
on war, allowing a comparison that involves their different cultural prospects regarding 
conflict. From the international relations stand point, it is also interesting to see how 
these interpretations of war may be compared with realist theory. Because of this, the 
following analysis will also identify and explain the relation between the books of both 
strategists and the theory of neorealism of Kenneth Waltz and classical realism of Hans 
Morgenthau. In this sense, I will develop the hypothesis that Carl von Clausewitz was 
closer to the realist approach than Sun Tzu and I will prove this by comparing them to 
the six principles that Hans Morgenthau proposed in his book “Politics Among 
Nations,” and to Kenneth Waltz’s book, “Man, the State and War.” It is necessary to 
remember that war has always been a fundamental part of a decision-making process to 
determine the future of entire kingdoms, empires, nations, and actually, states. Because 
of this, the importance of this research paper relies on the premise that learning and 
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investigating about war would be something necessary to understand the deeper 
reflections about this phenomenon, and so the relationship between both books “The Art 
of War” and “On War” would be a great contribution to the theory of realism.  
In order to conduct a proper study of both masterpieces, I will use a 
methodology called textual analysis. Textual analysis is a qualitative method which 
allows the researcher to undertake a deep investigation about a certain topic on the basis 
of written sources, such as books, magazines, or papers that had already been done by 
some authors (MkGee 2003 in Brainbridge 2016: 224). “Textual analysis is a way for 
researchers to gather information about how other human beings make sense of the 
world. It is a methodology a data-gathering process for those researchers who want to 
understand the ways in which members of various cultures and subcultures make sense 
of who they are, and of how they fit into the world in which they live” (MkGee 2003 in 
Brainbridge 2016: 224). This method specifically was selected in this research paper, 
because it is important to analyze and interpret qualitative data with the material 
provided by two of the main books about war. Thus, it is necessary to take into account 
that “When we perform textual analysis on a text, we make an educated guess at some 
of the most likely interpretations that might be made of that text (McKee 2003 in 
Brainbridge 2016: 224). McKee was one of the researchers that developed several 
studies using textual analysis as a tool and a methodology to study and interpret 
qualitative data, he states that:   
Performing textual analysis, then, is an attempt to gather information about 
sense-making practices - not only in cultures radically different from our own, 
but also within our own nations. It allows us to see how similar or different the 
sense-making practices that different people use can be. And it is also possible 
that this can allow us to better understand the sense-making cultures in which we 
ourselves live by seeing their limitations, and possible alternatives to them 
(McKee 2003: 14). 
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 Therefore, this methodology was chosen in this research paper as a method to 
compare two works on the same issue. In this sense, textual analysis will be used in the 
paper mainly to help interpret and establish relationships between the selected texts (in 
this case, the books “The Art of War” and “On War”) and the theory of realism. 
 
State of Art 
 
“The Art of War” of Sun Tzu and “On War” of Carl von Clausewitz have been two 
of the most ancient masterpieces in the study and interpretations of war. Because of this, 
there have been many theorists and scholars that have studied their writings and have 
commented on their work. Perhaps the most recognized critic who has compared Tzu 
and Clausewitz is Michael Handel. 
Michael Handel was a professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War College who has 
published extensively on war, national security and defense, diplomacy, intelligence, 
leadership, and strategy. In 1991, he wrote “Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War 
and On War Compared,” where he stated the most important characteristics and 
assumptions of both books, to understand how those ancient strategies are relevant to 
the field of war of nowadays. This can be seen in his book where the following is stated,  
Sun Tzu and Clausewitz identify the immutable "human" dimensions of warfare 
so essential for victory. It is ironic that the greatest works on war-the one human 
activity which continues to affect the future of mankind more than any other-
were written before the industrial age (Cerjan 1991 in Handel 1991, iii). 
It is undeniable that Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have affinities, taking into account 
their differences. Because of this, Handel considers the necessity of comparing their 
masterpieces with the objective “to discover the extent to which they are actually 
contradictory, similar, or complementary” (1991, 1). Moreover, it is important to 
understand that even if Sun Tzu represents the Chinese and Carl von Clausewitz 
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represents the Western perspective of war, Handel says that those “two seemingly 
divergent approaches actually have as much in common as what presumably separates 
them and that their fundamental strategic logic is often the same” (1991, 2). This fact is 
interesting to acknowledge, as both authors developed their books in completely distinct 
eras, as a result of the economic and socio-political aspects that were happening at that 
time. 
Also, something really important that Handel points out, is related to the structure of 
both books. On one hand, he talks about the importance of the sequence that Clausewitz 
presents in his book and the author’s use of a complex content. Handel mentions that 
“for example, Chapter One of Book I - "What Is War?" - cannot be understood easily 
even after several readings; yet this chapter is the key to comprehending Clausewitz's 
framework and methodology” (Handel 1991, 3). In contrast, Sun Tzu wrote his book in 
a way in which the readers can understand everything in an easier manner even if they 
are reading each chapter independently. In this sense, Handel says that “The Art of War 
does not offer the reader a systematic explanation or step-by-step reconstruction of the 
logical process through which concepts are developed” (1991, 3). Understanding how 
each author wrote his book, is helpful for the reader to comprehend the ideas that are 
constantly proposed on each page. 
One of the most heated discussions within the field of international relations has 
been between those realists who argue that war is considered to be science, and those 
who view it as art. According to Handel, even if Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have some 
differences they “would probably agree on the fundamental methodological assumption 
that war is an art and not a science- that each military problem has many potentially 
correct solutions (not just a single optimal solution)” (1991, 6). This is important to 
point out because both authors see war from the perspective of art, which derives from 
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the “imagination, creativity, and intuition of the military leader” (Handel 1991, 6). To 
be a strategist means having the imagination to design new plans according to the 
situation that is constantly changing. Also, the leader needs to be creative to avoid 
leading his army to destruction, wise to know how to save resources, and strategic 
enough to avoid committing mistakes. Because of this, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu do not 
treat war as something related to science, as there is no way to “formulate a positive 
theory of war even if certain laws or maxims are suggested” (Handel 1991, 6). For 
instance, each leader would know how to interpret and make decisions based on the 
situation they are experiencing, and they would take the best move from all, to attack or 
defend themselves and their army. 
Uncertainty is another characteristic of war that is recognized as important in the 
books of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Handel says that both “recognize that the complexity 
and unpredictability of war are created by the process of interaction…nothing is 
constant or predictable in war” (1991, 8). Due to the fact that nothing is predictable in 
war affairs, it is necessary to make effective strategies in order to know when and how 
to attack and defend. In this sense, 
Both agree that success in war depends on the talent of what Clausewitz terms 
the military genius- and on his coup d’oeil (or artistic intuition) which can be 
honed through experience but which cannot be developed by those without the 
innate ability (Handel 1991, 8).  
 The abilities acquired by the leader or the general who commands an army could 
only increase with experience. The more battles a commander fights, the better tactics 
and strategies he would develop. Handel states that “Success in war hinges not on a rote 
mastery of theory but on its judicious application, which in turn depends on the intuition 
of the military commander” (1991, 8). The intuition of the military commander is vital 
for having more chances to win wars and this is something that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu 
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recognize in their books. 
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have been seen as two ancient strategists of war that 
throughout their books tried to explain the same phenomenon from different 
perspectives and because of this, they are believed to have distinct interpretations of it. 
Nevertheless, Michael Handel does a great work pointing out how both authors instead 
of contradicting each other, can complement each other’s arguments. Probably, 
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have been closer than they seem, starting with how they 
consider war to be art and not science. They studied war and provided some strategies 
to win battles and solve conflicts in a shorter time, with more effective tactics that 
would reduce not only uncertainty, but also material and human costs. It is true that 
success during warfare can only be acquired if the commander could lead his army 
wisely, but victory can only be reached with expertise and the intuition of the leader.  
 
The “Art of War” and “On War” a brief description 
 
The study of warfare through the usage of books has been helpful for centuries, 
because within them may be found the main concepts, assumptions, and thoughts of 
their authors. At the same time, these books have become a pillar to understanding the 
advancements and changes throughout the years in what concerns war studies. For this 
reason, analyzing the structure and components of both books, “The Art of War” and 
“On War” would be helpful in order to state the main arguments and strategies of Sun 
Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz.  
To begin with, “The Art of War” is a book written by Sun Tzu (544 – 496 BC), a 
Chinese military general and a Taoist philosopher who lived about 2500 years ago, and 
who is “regarded as the founding father of military science in China” (Rusong and 
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Xianling 1999 in Tzu 1999, 23). He lived in a period when China was constantly facing 
external invasions and also threatened by domestic rebellions, due to the fact that “the 
country was beginning its transition from a time of slave-owning society to feudalism” 
(Rusong and Xianling 1999 in Tzu 1999, 21). His military strategies were focused on 
reaching victory in all those confrontations that tried to destabilize the kingdom he used 
to serve. Without a doubt, one of his greatest contributions was his book, which is 
composed of a total of thirteen chapters, in which he explains the most important 
strategies to win any kind of war. The thirteen chapters are: “Making Assessments,” 
“Waging War,” “Attacking by Stratagem,” “Disposition”, “Momentum”, “Weakness 
and Strengths”, “Contest to Gain the Initiative,” “Varying the Tactics,” “Deploying the 
Troops,” “The Terrain,” “Nine Regions,” “Attacking by Fire,” and “Using Spies”. All 
his chapters cover one specific area in warfare, for example, defense, resources, human 
lives, geography, strategy of attack, and uncertainty and espionage. Also, this book, 
which originally was written in bamboo strips because at that time the paper was not 
created yet, has not only been used in the studies of war and military strategies, but also 
in different fields of knowledge like in economics, marketing, philosophy, business and 
enterprise, and politics; as a consequence of this, it has been translated into 27 different 
languages. Without a doubt, 
The art of war can be described as an outstanding example of the Chinese 
cultural heritage. Representing the quintessence of Chinese military thinking, it 
summarizes the rich experiences of ancient wars and analyses them from 
political, economic, social, and cultural angles. Thus is often regarded as the 
military classic of the ancient world (Rusong and Xianlin 1999 in Tzu 1999, 25). 
In this sense, studying “The Art of War” is vital to try to understand the Chinese 
perspective of warfare from the strategies that an ancient military general who fought 
many battles proposed in his writings. Thus, the analysis of this book also remains 
under the precept that “The world can certainly benefit today and in the future from 
 14 
these legacies of Chinese military thinking… for the sake of defending peace and in 
raising high the banner of fighting a just war for the sake of opposing aggression” 
(Rusong and Xianlin 1999 in Tzu 1999: 25). 
Similarly, “On War” is a book written by Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who was 
a Prussian general and military thinker during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars. During his lifetime he wrote many books, but “On War” is perhaps his 
masterpiece. His contributions were mainly focused in joining politics to warfare in 
order to win armed conflicts. Based on his arguments, in his book he proposes 
interesting assumptions about disarming, defeating, and destroying the enemy. “On 
War” is divided in three main parts where he addresses three main topics: the nature of 
war, armed forces, and attack. All of them contain different chapters where he explains 
what he considers to be war, its risks, means and ends, the role of uncertainty, strategy, 
perseverance, weapons, shelter, defense, the power of force, attacks, war planning, and 
politics. According to Gabriel Cardona, a professor of University of Barcelona, “in this 
complex moment of world politics, the reading of the Prussian general can help to 
understand some of the most difficult problems of peace, of war, and of collective 
violence” (Cardona 2004 in Clausewitz 1832, XXVII). 
As can be seen, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz are authors that have developed 
interesting theories about war. Both have many similarities and they may be considered 
to be similar to realism, but also they differ in how they take on certain topics. Even if 
they address common issues of war like uncertainty, the nature of war, defense and 
attack, and resources, both give a different vision of them. It is clear that they belong to 
distinct eras and cultural backgrounds, but their masterpieces have been studied 
throughout the years and they have influenced the study of warfare that have been 
applied until now, especially in different worldwide academies dedicated to analyzing 
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aspects like war-planning by the use of strategies and military advances, national 
defense studies, and securitization. 
 
Realist comparison between Clausewitz, Tzu, and Waltz 
 
After having faced many wars between nations, severe economic crisis, massive 
deaths as a result of man-made disasters, failed states, and other problems that have 
affected entire societies, researchers of different schools of thought have proposed and 
explained several theories that lie in the field of international relations, which try to 
understand the world from different perspectives. In general terms, the purpose of 
studying and developing those different paradigms, is not only to safeguard peace and 
security, and limit wars and conflicts among nations in the world we live today, but also 
to understand the progress throughout the years of this field of social sciences by 
analyzing different actors and concepts like power, institutions, individuals, states, 
international organizations, and others. There have been realist, liberal, and radical 
theories and other approaches, which have constantly competed against each other in 
order to explain the distinct phenomena that our world has and so, they have become a 
strong basis for the study of international relations (Walt 1998, 30). Nevertheless, in this 
work, the theory of neorealism applied to international conflicts that Kenneth Waltz 
provides will be examined, along with some postulates of classical realism developed 
by Hans Morgenthau, as they bear an undeniable relationship with the studies and 
theories about the perception of wars. 
Kenneth Waltz was an American political scientist who studied and made great 
contributions to the neorealist approach in order to explain many assumptions related to 
the conception of power throughout war processes and the behavior of men influenced 
by their impulse to pursue their interests. Without a doubt, one of his most famous 
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statements that synthesizes his central idea about war is  that “According to the first 
image of international relations, the locus of the important causes of war is found in the 
nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive 
impulses, from stupidity” (Waltz 2001, 16). In this statement, it is clear that Waltz 
settles the importance of analyzing the human behavior and its nature, in order to 
understand the main causes of war and their implications. Historically, power has 
always been sought and desired by men and their governments, so in order to attain it 
they have fallen into long periods of constant wars and conflicts between nations. 
Because of this, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz conducted deeper studies of wars 
centuries ago, as both became great sources of information for analyzing and proposing 
some important strategies that have even been applied into the actual world as strategic 
advices for winning and gaining power during hard periods of conflict.  
In order to understand the comparison between both authors in the light of Waltzist 
neorealist approach, it is essential to begin with the definition of war that Sun Tzu and 
Clausewitz propose in their books. Both betray differences in their definitions about 
war, but they coincide in their statement saying that the main objective is to win and 
claim victory. First, Tzu says “War is a game of deception. Therefore, feign incapability 
when in fact capable; feign inactivity when ready to strike; appear to be far away when 
actually nearby, and vice versa” (1999, 7). Starting from this definition of war, it can be 
seen that the point of view that this Chinese general offered is clearly strategic. Carl von 
Clausewitz states that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will…Force is thus the means of war; to impose out will on the enemy is the object” 
(1832, 75). As can be seen, for Clausewitz the use of force is something necessary to 
defeat the enemy, and he says that force is conceived as “physical force, for moral force 
has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law-is thus the means of war; to 
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impose our will on the enemy is its object” (1832, 75). Here, the superiority of force 
highlights as a strategy to defeat the enemy’s forces and make them render powerless. 
Also, Clausewitz provides another definition which is necessary to understand the 
essence of his argument, he states that “War is merely the continuation of policy by 
other means…The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and 
means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (1832, 87). In this sense, 
it is clear that their difference in defining war also relies on the precept that Sun Tzu 
never states in an explicit manner, the linkage between politics and war, as Clausewitz 
do. Nevertheless, according to both definitions, victories in wars as a result of defeating 
the enemy are also necessary to bring wealth, prosperity, and strengths to the state that 
the commanders and their troops are representing. Certainly, war has been a difficult 
item to analyze in the field of realism, as it is directly linked to a process of humans 
taking hard decisions to achieve their victory against their enemies. Because of this, 
Kenneth Waltz explains that “the evilness of men, or their improper behavior, leads to 
war: individual goodness, if it could be universalized would mean peace…” (2001, 39). 
Pursuing their interests have been so important that no matter the consequences it would 
lead, war has always been a way to solve international conflicts, in which its origins 
resides in the human nature. 
The realist approach shares the idea that states will always look after their interests 
and their sovereignty, and Waltz also comes up with interesting concepts related to the 
human behavior, international conflict, and their relationship with the perpetual peace, 
which are important terms used in war affairs and they are helpful as well, to understand 
one of the main strategies that both, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz propose in their work. Sun 
Tzu explains the national interest as the kind of motivation that the commanders need to 
inspire in their troops, as this would be used as a wise strategy in order to gain their 
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confidence. Tzu claims that a true commander would know how to use emotions and 
feelings like anger, cowardice, fear, patriotism, or honor in order to serve to their 
empire and fight against the enemy with truthful convincement and this will lead them 
to work and battle as a team (1999, 47-51). Because of this, he states in his seventh 
strategy named “Contest to Gain the Initiative” that  
Drums, gongs, flags, and banners are used to coordinate the sights and hearing 
of the troops so that they will act as one, so that the brave will not have to 
advance alone, nor the timid retreat by themselves. This is the art of directing a 
large number of troops (Tzu 1999, 51). 
Creating a feeling of nationalism when going to any war, is something 
fundamental to the troops for they need to work as a team that will represent their 
empire, or state. On the other hand, Clausewitz explains that the national interest is 
something that influences and affects the entire nation, and so “if the motives and 
policies are directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be 
little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back” (Clausewitz 
1832, 88). For this reason, the commander and his army have to follow the natural 
tendency of war where the motives are so strong and fierce that the main objective of 
defeating the enemy would be undeniable. Under those statements, Waltz claims that  
In moments of crisis and especially in the crisis of war, attempts to achieve a 
nearly unanimous backing for foreign policy are most likely to be successful. 
The united front is enforced by the feelings of individuals, by their conviction 
that their own security depends on the security of their state (2001, 179). 
This is a clear example to explain the assumption that the feelings of individuals have 
been a result of the crisis of war. For instance, they start supporting and raising their 
nationalism to pursue a common interest, winning the war. 
Moreover, Kenneth Waltz has also set forth ideas that are helpful to connect 
strategist visions with the explanations and perceptions of war, for example, he states 
that “Knowledge leads to control” (2001, 75). Agreeing with this statement, Carl von 
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Clausewitz mentioned that a clever leader must have a certain intelligence to have more 
knowledge to plan his strategies during a battle, for this reason he states “By 
"intelligence" we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country- the 
basis, in short, of our own plans and operations” (1832, 117). At the same time, 
Clausewitz also says that “Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, 
our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating…with uncertainty in one scale, courage 
and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance... war is the 
realm of uncertainty” (Clausewitz 1832, 86-101). Uncertainty is undeniable in wars and 
both, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree with this statement. Sun Tzu reaffirms that it is 
fundamental to know the movements and plans of the enemy, for this reason he 
proposes the thirteenth strategy, based on the usage of spies. He states that  
The foreknowledge cannot be obtained from ghosts or spirits, nor from gods, nor 
by analogy with past events, nor from astrological calculations. It can only come 
from men who know the enemy situation…Secret operations are essential in 
war; upon them the army relies in deciding its every move (Tzu 1999, 108-113).  
Uncertainty is seen as a weakness that is needed to be avoided in order to gain 
advantage in the face of the adversary, so this means that spies have always been 
essential to facilitate the work of collecting information and with this, the commander 
could be prepare to make the next move. 
Waltz also states that “Since each state acts on its own interpretation of its 
requirements for security and well-being, one state has to forecast the intentions of other 
states” (2001, 211). It is true that every state has its own interpretation of the situations 
that have been settled during war periods. Because of this, knowing the intentions of 
other states will become a vital advantage to take and move around good decisions. Tzu 
says that a good commander will always be prepared to take those decisions and claims 
that “it is a rule in war that you must not count on the enemy not coming, but always be 
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ready for him; that you must not count on the enemy not attacking, but make yourself so 
strong that you are invincible” (1999, 57). Being prepared for everything that could 
come is not easy, but is an indispensable characteristic of a good leader and 
commander. Clausewitz alludes to “wisdom” as a feature that a commander should 
have, for “During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be 
no time to review the situation or even to think it through” (1832, 102). If a leader 
shows wisdom, he could take the best decisions and will avoid huge risks and terrible 
consequences, he would also use other possible strategies to reach his goal and defeat 
his enemy. Also, Clausewitz says that any good and clever commander “should possess 
a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and 
from common sense” (1832, 117). This statement is linked with Clausewitz’ ideas 
against feeling compassion for the enemy, as for him is not an option in warfare, and 
being a wise leader also means to make decisions by being aware that “war is such a 
dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst” 
(Clausewitz 1832, 75).  
Another strategy of Sun Tzu, is called “The Terrain” in which he wrote  
On such a terrain, he who first occupies the sunny high ground and establishes 
convenient supply routes has the advantage in battle…Advantageous terrain can 
be a natural ally in battle. Superior military leadership lies in the ability to assess 
the enemy´s situation and create conditions for victory, to analyze natural 
hazards and calculate distances. He who fights with full knowledge of these 
factors is certain to win (1999,73-77). 
Without a doubt, a true strategist must know how to move around a certain terrain, as it 
will be used as a primary tool in order to plan future attacks and to find evacuation 
routes in case something goes wrong. In other words, Clausewitz states “In these ways 
the relationship between warfare and terrain determines the peculiar character of 
military action…It is faculty of quickly and accurately grasping the topography of any 
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area which enables a man to find his way about at any time” (2001, 109). In this case, 
the geographical features play an important role in strategic planning to use nature’s 
benefits in one’s favor. 
Kenneth Waltz wrote that “states are motivated to attack each other and to defend 
themselves by the reason and/or passion of the comparatively few who make policies 
for states and of the many more who influence the few” (2001, 232). This statement 
leads to perhaps one of the main strategies of Sun Tzu named “Momentum”, in which 
he addresses the importance of knowing how to use both, the qi and zheng. “`Qi´ 
denotes the use of unusual and unexpected methods, of sudden, surprise attacks, of 
flanking movements in military operations; while `zheng´ denotes the use of normal and 
regular methods, of frontal attacks and defensive moves in military operations” (Tzu 
1999, 35). In warfare, a wise commander must know when to use the force to attack and 
when to use certain tactics to defend his troops from the adversary. Also, Clausewitz 
defends the idea that “The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and 
trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that 
he should fight at the right place and the right time” (1832, 95). He sets the idea that 
during any war, a good leader has to learn both offensive and defensive war and these 
strategies would lead the commander to a more marked victory. On the one hand, the 
objective of offensive war is to reduce the forces of the other, or to occupy the other’s 
territory (Clausewitz 1832, 611). On the other hand, defensive tactics are considered to 
be the most effective forms of war, as they help to keep one’s territory safe and 
impenetrable, and it encourages the leader to lay traps for the enemy (Clausewitz 1832, 
614). Both of them are necessary to plan strategies of attack and defense, for the leader 
not only has to be prepared to apply the force and violence to win, but he also has to 
wait and defend his own territory. 
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After having compared different scopes among war issues, it becomes clear the 
close relationship borne between both realist strategists. Even if Sun Tzu and Carl von 
Clausewitz lived in different eras, and have distinct concepts of the meaning of war, 
both propose strategies of war that actually are really close to each other. First, both talk 
about war as power and as the exertion of force, which directly influences in the 
conception of how they propose to pursue the collective national interests, which at the 
same time would be achieved after winning the war. Besides, the evident influence of 
the human nature in warfare, uncertainty and security are linked to the importance of the 
role of wisdom while taking decisions, as every decision the commander takes can 
determine whether a war could be won or not. Thus, depending on the capacity to know 
and use the territory, the leader can plan and build effective and efficient battle 
strategies, without forgetting perhaps two of the most important strategies, knowing 
when to attack and to defend. Without a doubt, all these strategies are built under the 
theory of contemporary realism that Kenneth Waltz wrote about, for his strong 
convincement that there is and will always be an undeniable relationship between men, 
states, and wars, allows to understand those strategies in a better manner under the eyes 
of neorealism. Also, it is necessary to acknowledge that even if Sun Tzu and Carl von 
Clausewitz have several similarities when they are being analyzed through the Waltzist 
perspective, they differ with Kenneth Waltz in one of his most well-known postulate 
that states “violence among states is the product of international anarchy” (Waltz 2001, 
14). For both ancient strategists of war, conflicts arise due to the impossibility of 
reaching a mutual agreement with the adversary through politics, or dialogues. 
Therefore, they do not take into account the influence of anarchy in the system to 
establish their strategies, and as Waltz states is vital to be aware that “In anarchy, there 
is no automatic harmony” (2001, 160). This is fundamental to understand, for Kenneth 
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Waltz provides a new perspective to take into account in warfare, and so if his theory 
about the influence of anarchy would have been considered at the time of Sun Tzu or 
Clausewitz, their strategies to win battles among states would probably had also been 
focused on preventing war by looking at the functionality of the international system, 
based on the assumption that the system is anarchical.  
 
Closer to realism: Sun Tzu vs Carl von Clausewitz 
 
In the previous chapter, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz were analytically 
compared with the most relevant postulates of the neorealist theory that Kenneth Waltz 
provided. Making this comparison has been important for it has clearly proven that 
indeed, Tzu and Clausewitz belong to the realist approach. Because of this, in the 
present chapter I will analyze which author is considered to be closer to the realist 
perspective as a theoretical approach, even if it has already seen that both are congruent 
with it. In order to understand certain key aspects of the realist vision in this chapter, 
some of the six principles that Morgenthau established in his book “Politics Among 
Nations” will also be compared with Tzu and Clausewitz. My hypothesis in this section, 
is that Carl von Clausewitz is closer to the classical realist paradigm, for his ideas and 
his way of thinking can be directly linked to some of the principles of Hans 
Morgenthau.  
Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz contain many statements that can be clearly 
identified with the realist approach throughout their books, but they propose strategies 
focusing on distinct aspects. One of them is their conception of how to win wars. For 
Sun Tzu, his primary goal “is to find a way to defeat the enemy without actually 
fighting him…he does not advocate sacrificing in order to accomplish victory” 
(Zapotoczny 2006, 1). So this shows that he gave priority to the use of intelligence over 
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military force to win. Clausewitz focuses on “the destruction of the enemy’s army and 
occupation of its territory as overriding goals of warfare” (Zapotoczny 2006, 1), which 
means that he says that victory could only be acquired by force in a violent way. In this 
sense, he also says that “we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the 
true aim of warfare” (1832, 75). This is an example of how they plan to win wars using 
different paths. It is true that as the classical realist approach establishes that the pursuit 
of power is something unavoidable for “power appears an end-in-itself…necessary for 
success in competitive struggles…struggles for power arise because men are born 
seekers of power” (Waltz 2001, 35). Because of this, Tzu agrees to reach power, but he 
wants to “force the enemy to do one’s will and sue for peace as a result” (Zapotoczny 
2006, 1), and this does not mean that for achieving that goal the enemy has to be 
completely destroyed as Clausewitz assumes. Following this statement, Morgenthau 
establishes in his first principle that “Political realism believes that politics, like society 
in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (1948, 
4). Morgenthau complements this idea when he states “the selfishness of man has 
limits: his will to power has none” (1948, 193). Clausewitz could clearly be identified 
with the previous statement, for his ideas about winning wars at all costs lies on this 
premise about the human nature and the necessity to feel and gain power to satisfy one’s 
interests. In this sense, Morgenthau’s second assumption states that 
The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of 
power…We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. The assumption 
allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman- past, present, 
or future- has taken or will take on the political scene (Morgenthau 1948, 5). 
 
Clausewitz has written his book basing his arguments on the importance of preparing 
strategies for the commander, or statesman to win wars and they are constantly fitting 
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with the idea of thinking about power defined in terms of interests, as in the realist 
approach. For this reason, On War is the best example to analyze “the strategic-
operational realm, at the point where diplomacy has failed and fighting is unavoidable” 
(Cher 2015, 68). On the other hand, when reading The Art of War, one can see that it 
“approaches the subject of war at the grand strategy level” (Cher 2015, 68). This shows 
that Sun Tzu took into consideration diplomatic and economic factors, whereas 
Clausewitz saw those factors as clear failures, and so this sets war as eminent where 
there is no turning back.  
Moreover, Clausewitz recognized a paradoxical trinity composed by “people 
(representing primordial violence, passion, hate and enmity); the military (representing 
the realm of probability and chance, courage and talent); and the government 
(representing the rational calculus, nexus between ends and means)” (Cher 2015, 70). 
For him, the equilibrium of this trinity is the key to achieve victory through warfare, as 
each of them represents something essential to take into account at his strategic 
operational level. Sun Tzu used another paradoxical trinity that influences in the process 
of wars, but he focuses of “three factors of nature, terrain and law” (Cher 2015, 70). In a 
different sense, Tzu makes clear that both elements, the natural environment and the 
military doctrine, are factors that are necessarily be considered when making strategies. 
For Sun Tzu, the more dragged on the conflict is, the more destruction will be caused. 
In contrast, Clausewitz does not consider those factors in his strategic planning, as for 
him any kind of loses are justified in order to achieve victory and this is also related to 
the third principle of Morgenthau, where he affirms that  
Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man 
over man. Thus power covers all social relationships that serve that end, from 
physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind 
controls another… as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and 
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barbaric force that finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole 
justification in its aggrandizement (Morgenthau 1948, 13). 
 
The realist approach views the study of conflict resolution processes through wars 
and this is the reason why Clausewitz and Tzu belong to this branch of international 
relations. As can be seen, in both books they analyze what they consider to be the best 
strategies to reach victory and power, which is linked to the theory of realism. Sun Tzu 
and Carl von Clausewitz have a different manner to plan their strategies and they give 
priorities to some issues like preserving resources or the influence of diplomacy in 
warfare, but still their goal is to win battles. These authors have also been analyzed in 
the light of the main principles that Hans Morgenthau proposed, but there are 
differences in this regard between the two ancient authors. For instance, it is clear that 
Carl von Clausewitz can be considered to be closer to the realist approach, for he can 
justify every action the commander takes under the condition to reach his final goal 
with reference to the realm of human nature, which remains in the first principle of 
Morgenthau. Instead of being worried about winning without starting a fight, 
Clausewitz “was largely preoccupied with the massive application of the force and 
attempts to mitigate friction in combat operations. He defined friction as suffering, 
confusion, exhaustion, and fear” (Zapotoczny 2006, 1). Throughout the several battles 
he fought, Clausewitz applied his concept of friction to disarm and defeat his enemy 
without mercy in order to pursue power and the statesman interest, which can also be 
seen in the second and third principle of Morgenthau. Clausewitz for instance, 
considered it to be one of the most relevant and effective strategies of his book and that 
is the reason why he put so much emphasis on the importance of applying force and 
violence to win. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Wars have been a fundamental part of the history of our world. Wars have been 
considered to be one way to solve disputes among nations, so they have been studied for 
centuries especially in the conflict resolution area. Many scholars have written about the 
causes, consequences, and strategies of war, but without a doubt, the most recognized 
and most studied books of all times are “On War” of Carl von Clausewitz, and “The Art 
of War” of Sun Tzu. Those books have been considered to be the greatest masterpieces 
in the study about war. At the same time, they provide a Western and an Eastern 
perspective about war in different epochs, for the first one was written in 1832 in what 
at that time was Prussia, and the second one was written around the end of the 4th 
century B.C in China. While studying the postulates of each book, one can determine 
that they have much more similarities than differences, even if both were written under 
distinct circumstances, as they belong to different eras and fought miscellaneous wars. 
Moreover, it is necessary to understand that their books, their strategies, and their ideas 
about warfare can be subsumed under the realist paradigm, so both of them belong to 
the same theoretical approach. 
Many scholars have thought that both books are almost completely different due 
to the historical and cultural background of each author, but their similarities are 
constantly showing up, even when both are being studied from both, the classical realist 
perspective of Hans Morgenthau and the neorealist assumptions of Kenneth Waltz. 
Starting from their definition of war, one can see that Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz 
talk about exerting force and dominance to achieve the goal of defeating the enemy, yet 
they refer to the use of violence in different manners. Both strategists agree that due to 
the necessity that humans feel to gain more and more power, a commander needs to be 
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objective and take the best decisions for the benefits of his troops, so objectivity has to 
prevail among feelings and emotions that are characteristics of the human nature. 
Nevertheless, they say that a good leader must know how to manage his troops and the 
emotions of his soldiers, for those are also important items to convince them that they 
are fighting a war to represent the interests of the entire nation. Moreover, decision-
making processes are fundamental to determine a victory or a defeat during a combat, 
so the commander according to both authors, needs to have some key characteristics 
such as wisdom, objectivity, and rationality to handle every unexpected event without a 
problem. Also, an important factor in war to be taken into consideration is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is one of the hugest problems that commanders face in a conflict of any 
kind, for they will never know the exact strategies or intentions of their opponent. For 
this reasons, both authors talk about this topic in a meticulous way. Specifically, Sun 
Tzu proposes the usage of spies to reduce uncertainty and gain advantage. Another 
common topic of both books is when their authors explain the importance of knowing 
the terrain where the battle has been set up. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz talk about the need 
of the commander to apply their expertise to move wisely around the terrain, for all of 
that kind of factors can determine the result of the battle. In armed conflicts, there is an 
imminent need to not only know how to attack, but also to know how to defend yourself 
from the enemy. Defensive and offensive attacks are important for the leader, but 
according to Clausewitz, defensive war has more advantages and it is more effective, 
for at the same time the commander defends himself and his troops, he has the 
possibility to plan how and when to lay traps and create strategies to defeat the 
adversary.  
After having established several differences and similarities that both authors 
have, their belonging to the theory of realism is indisputable. For this reason, I have 
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considered to be interesting to analyze which one of both authors can be closer to the 
classical realist approach. To accomplish the goal of this section, I looked at some of the 
six principles that Hans Morgenthau, a classical realist theorist of international relations, 
proposed, for comparing them to some of the statements of Carl von Clausewitz and 
Sun Tzu respectively. One of the main points in the presented argument was that Sun 
Tzu planned to win wars without even fighting them, but if that was not possible, he 
agreed to impose force and dominance to the enemy. On the contrary, Clausewitz never 
considered the possibility to reach a mutual gain resolution, for him the optimal 
resolution was to defeat the enemy at all costs, justifying the legitimacy of using 
violence to attack, disarm, kill, and totally destroy the enemy in order to avoid future 
conflicts. After the analysis, it was clear that indeed the hypothesis that I initially 
proposed was proved, Carl von Clausewitz can be considered to be closer to the 
classical realist approach than Sun Tzu. Nevertheless, it is necessary to clarify that 
neither of the two classical thinkers of war agree with Waltz when he establishes the 
idea of basing the systemic nature of war under the principle of anarchy. Therefore, 
even if I consider Clausewitz to be closest to the realist approach, both fit in a better 
way under the postulates of Morgenthau, based on the classical realist premise.  
Understanding the importance of learning and developing studies about warfare 
relies on the premise that even until nowadays, war has still become a fundamental topic 
in foreign affairs and in international politics of most of the countries around the world. 
Even if today new theories and strategies about conflict resolution processes have 
arisen, war is always going to be a frequent used medium to pursue the interests of 
every nation and this has been proven throughout the years. There is a need to recognize 
that “As war becomes even more complex, the need to explore its fundamental nature is 
no less important than in the past” (Cerjal 1991 in Handel 1991, iv) and so, studying 
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both masterpieces have always been important in different areas to understand the 
development of our world itself. Also, taking into account that even if technology has 
drastically evolved and diplomacy has been taken as a useful tool into the foreign policy 
of distinct nations, it is interesting to see that “On War” and “The Art of War” are still 
being used as key books of strategy planning for resolving disputes among countries. It 
is well-known that every warfare brings out big loses and massive destruction to every 
country who takes part in it, so in order to reduce the costs and risks that entering into a 
conflict between states takes, studying the strategies about war proposed by Tzu and 
Clausewitz is something vital even nowadays. Just as Sun Tzu says, “war is a question 
of vital importance to the state, a matter of life and death, the road to survival or ruin. 
Hence, it is a subject which calls for careful study” (1999, 3). Certainly, the importance 
of both authors resides on the premise that “Of all the classic studies on war, ‘The Art 
of War’ by Sun Tzu and ‘On War’ by Clausewitz are still the most outstanding, 
‘modern,’ and relevant despite the passage of time” (Cerjal 1991 in Handel 1991, iii). 
All in all, it has been clear that learning, studying, and developing theories and 
strategies about war affairs through a Western and an Eastern perspective, help us to 
understand not only the complexities about war as a phenomenon that is still happening 
in the 21st century, but also to understand the development that our world has had 
throughout the years. 
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